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Civil Procedure: 
Certifying an Opt-In Class under Rule 23 
 
Scott Dodson1 
 
In 1966, rulemakers amended Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure to create the new (b)(3) class action with an “opt 
out” mechanism for establishing who is in the class. Previously, class 
actions followed an “opt in” mechanism, in which a person fitting 
within the scope of the class was by default not a class member 
unless she affirmatively joined the class. The current opt-out 
mechanism, by contrast, makes any person fitting within the scope of 
the class definition a class member by default unless she 
affirmatively excludes herself from the class. 
Debates about the proper mechanism for determining who is in 
the class have tracked this history, resulting in a bimodal, either-or 
debate: advocates favor either an opt-in or an opt-out mechanism. I 
argue for a compromise approach: let the class choose whether to 
proceed on an opt-out or an opt-in basis. 
 
Why Give the Class an Opt-In Option? 
 
My approach reflects the reality that not all nonmandatory class 
actions have the same needs: some class actions might warrant an 
opt-out mechanism, while others might warrant an opt-in 
mechanism. 
Take, for example, a class of individuals personally injured by a 
defective airbag. The claimants’ injuries vary significantly and have 
high expected values. They may prefer to litigate in various home-
state forums around the nation rather than in a single forum. For this 
class, the high claim values and context-dependent nature of proof 
suggest deference to individual litigation autonomy. Thus, an opt-in 
class might be a good fit. Those who want to opt in are likely to do 
so, and the class then will be composed of only those claimants who 
have expressly consented to aggregate litigation. The class will be 
small but strong—it will not be diluted by unknown claimants with 
                                                 
1. Summarized and excerpted from Scott Dodson, An Opt-In Option 
for Class Actions, 115 MICH. L. REV. 171 (2016). 
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claims of unknown strength, and the defendant need not fear an 
overbroad class of faceless plaintiffs. 
In contrast, in a class of shareholders of the company that 
manufactures the airbag, whose stock depreciated significantly after 
the airbag defects were made public, questions of liability are 
relatively uniform but many claimants’ damages will be small. 
Location and other individualized litigation choices matter far less. 
This class may prefer an opt-out class, in which inertia works in 
favor of the many small stakeholders by keeping them in the class 
while allowing large stakeholders to overcome that inertia, if they 
wish to opt out. At the same time, the common focus on liability 
renders individualized litigant autonomy less important. 
These classes demand different treatment, and the solution is to 
accommodate those differences through choice. The class is in the 
best position to know the needs of the class and the mechanism that 
best suits it, so the class should get to choose to proceed via opt in or 
opt out. 
 
Is the Choice Real? 
 
Why would a class ever elect to proceed as an opt-in class? 
Because certification should be easier. The greater cohesion and 
stronger representational qualities of opt-in classes necessarily affect 
the certifiability of class actions because opt-in classes present fewer 
ascertainability, cohesiveness, and representational concerns. In a 
nutshell, opt-in classes ought to meet the certification requirements 
more easily than opt-out classes simply because their class members 
have affirmatively opted in. 
Ascertainability, for example, should be largely satisfied by opt-
in claimants’ self-identification, which effectively meets the class-
administration goals of effective notice, administrative feasibility, 
and preclusion identification. The (a)(4) adequacy and (b)(3) 
superiority requirements also are more easily met by opt-ins, which 
signal stronger consent to the nature and arrangement of the class and 
its representatives, and which approximate joined individual actions, 
lessening any advantage individual actions might hold. All told, then, 
opt-in classes should have an easier time at certification than opt-out 
classes. 
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Are Opt-In Classes Lawful? 
 
Some federal appellate courts have rejected the power of district 
judges to certify opt-in classes under Rule 23. The leading case is 
Kern v. Siemens Corp., in which the Second Circuit held that Rule 
23(c)’s express opt-out provision implicitly prohibits an opt-in class.2 
With respect, Kern is wrong. Nothing in Rule 23 expressly 
prohibits opt-in classes or constrains the definition of the class, and 
nothing prevents a court from taking the opt-in status of class 
members into consideration when assessing certification. The class is 
free to write the class definition to include only those claimants who 
have affirmatively opted in. 
Of course, the current rule does not permit the replacement of the 
opt-out right with an opt-in requirement. The elimination of an opt-
out right in a Rule 23(b)(3) class is clearly contrary to the deliberate 
choices of the 1966 drafters and to the express language of Rule 
23(c). But nothing in Rule 23 prevents the addition of opt-in 
features—such as a class definition with language requiring 
affirmative consent—if class members also have a right to opt out. 
In addition, Rule 23(d) gives district courts authority to manage 
the class. One of Rule 23(d)’s specific grants of authority is to 
“giv[e] appropriate notice to some or all class members of . . . the 
members’ opportunity to signify whether they consider the 
representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present claims or 
defenses, or to otherwise come into the action.” Courts have 
interpreted Rule 23(d)’s general grant of authority broadly, extending 
to the power to require the defendant to bear the cost of notifying 
class members (despite the general rule that the class bears that cost) 
and the power to grant opt-out rights to class members of ostensibly 
“mandatory” classes certified under Rule 23(b)(1) and Rule 23(b)(2) 
(despite the lack of such express authorization in Rule 23). Rule 
23(c) and (d) are thus broad enough to allow a class definition to be 
restricted to those who affirmatively include themselves in the class. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2. 393 F.3d 120, 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2004).  The Fifth Circuit has 
followed Kern.  See Ackal v. Centennial Beauregard Cellular, L.L.C., 700 
F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2012). 
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How Should Courts Manage Opt-In Classes? 
 
Rule 23 opt-out notices, and collective-action opt-in notices 
under the FLSA and related statutes, both follow the rule that any 
written evidence of the desire to opt in should suffice. No specific 
form is mandated; any consent made in writing bearing the person’s 
signature and evincing an intent to join is valid regardless of its form, 
though the court should retain some discretion to require more formal 
opt-in notices, either generally or on a member-specific basis, if 
circumstances warrant. 
As for timing, the earlier opt-in notices are filed, the more 
meaningful they are to certification requirements and class-definition 
choices. A class opting to proceed on an opt-in basis likely has some 
knowledge of the identity of many members at the outset. However, 
informed decisionmaking depends upon effective notice, so opt-in 
elections should take place after notice of some of the details of the 
class action, including the class definition, the representatives, the 
class counsel, the defendants, and the claims. This procedure is 
analogous to the established conditional-certification procedure in 
the collective-action context. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Opt-in classes are lawful under Rule 23 and should be used at the 
class’s behest as a way to fit the right option mechanism to the right 
class action. 
